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Summary
“Extradition” is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for
prosecution or punishment. Extradition to or from the United States is a creature of
treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations
of the world. International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an
increasingly important law enforcement tool. This is a brief overview of federal law
in the area and of the adjustments in recent treaties to make them more responsive
to American law enforcement interests.
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and generate the most
controversy with respect to those matters for which extradition may not be had. In
addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most
modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which
extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding
purely military and political offenses; capital offenses; crimes that are punishable
under only the laws of one of the parties to the treaty; crimes committed outside the
country seeking extradition; crimes where the fugitive is a national of the country of
refuge; and crimes barred by double jeopardy or a statute of limitations.
Extradition is triggered by a request submitted through diplomatic channels. In
this country, it proceeds through the Departments of Justice and State and may be
presented to a federal magistrate to order a hearing to determine whether the request
is in compliance with an applicable treaty, whether it provides sufficient evidence to
satisfy probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the identified treaty
offense(s), and whether other treaty requirements have been met. If so, the
magistrate certifies the case for extradition at the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Except as provided by treaty, the magistrate does not inquire into the nature of
foreign proceedings likely to follow extradition.
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern
extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. Requests travel
through diplomatic channels and the only issue likely to arise after extradition to this
country is whether the extraditee has been tried for crimes other than those for which
he or she was extradited. The fact that extradition was ignored and a fugitive forcibly
returned to the United States for trial constitutes no jurisdictional impediment to trial
or punishment. Federal and foreign immigration laws sometimes serve as a less
controversial alternative to extradition to and from the United States.
Related reports include CRS Report RL32096, Extradition Between the United
States and Great Britain: The 2003 Treaty; and CRS Report RS21633, Extradition
Between the United States and Great Britain: A Sketch of the 2003 Treaty.
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1 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (Supp. 1935); see also, 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 556-57 (1986)(RESTATEMENT). In
the parlance of international law nations are identified as “states.” In order to avoid
confusion, the several states of the United States will be referred to as “the states of the
United States.”
Interstate rendition, the formal surrender of a person by one of the states of the United
States to another, is also sometimes referred to as extradition, but is beyond the scope of this
report.
2 The list of countries along with the citations to our treaties follow 18 U.S.C. 3181. A
similar list is appended to this report, as is a list of the countries with whom we have no
extradition treaty in force at the present time.
3 Until the early 1970's, the United States received and submitted fewer than 50 extradition
requests a year; by the mid 1980's the number had grown to over 500 requests a year, IV
ABBELL & RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL ‚ EXTRADITION
(ABBELL & RISTAU) 11-18 (1990).
4 Even the term “extradition” did not appear until the late eighteenth century, BLAKESLY,
TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE, ROLE, AND IMPACT IN
MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND EXTRADITION 171 (1992). For
a more extensive examination of the history of extradition, see, Blakesly, The Practice of
Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief History, 4
BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 39 (1981); Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-6 (Supp. 1935); BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (BASSIOUNI) 31-5 (4th ed. 2002); ABBELL & RISTAU at
3-11.
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Introduction
“‘Extradition’ is the formal surrender of a person by a State to another State for
prosecution or punishment.”1 Extradition to or from the United States is a creature
of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with over a hundred of the nations
of the world.2 International terrorism and drug trafficking have made extradition an
increasingly important law enforcement tool.3 This is a brief overview of federal law
in the area and of the adjustments made in recent treaties to accommodate American
law enforcement interests.
Although extradition as we know it is of relatively recent origins,4 its roots can
be traced to antiquity. Scholars have identify procedures akin to extradition scattered
CRS-2
5 Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite king, Hattusili III, entered into a pact under which they
promised to extradite fugitives of both noble and humble birth, Treaty Between Hattusili and
Ramesses II, §§11-14, transliteration and translation in, Langdon & Gardiner, The Treaty
of Alliance Between Hattusili, King of the Hittites, and the Pharaoh Ramesses II of Egypt,
6 JOURNAL OF EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179, 192-94 (1920). Until fairly recently, nations
seem have been happily rid of those who fled rather than face punishment. The Egyptian-
Hittite treaty reflects the fact that extradition existed primarily as an exception to the more
favored doctrines of asylum and banishment. Fugitives returned pursuant to the treaty
received the benefits of asylum in the form of amnesty, “If one man flee from the land of
Egypt, or two, or three, and they come to the great chief of Hatti, the great chief of Hatti
shall seize them and shall cause them to be brought to Ramesse-mi-Amun, the great ruler
of Egypt. But as for the man who shall be brought to Ramesse-mi-Amun, the great ruler of
Egypt, let not his crime be charged against him, let not his house, his wives or his children
be destroyed, let him not be killed, let no injury be done to his eyes, to his ears, to his mouth
or to his legs . . .” §17, id. at 197.
6 1 RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Subchapter 7B, 557, citing, GROTIUS, DE JURE
BELLI AC PACIS, Vol.II, ch.21, §§3-4 (J.Scott ed. 1925).
7 “By the latter part of the nineteenth century that [principle] had yielded to the view that
delivery of persons charged with, or convicted of, crimes in another state was at most a
moral duty, not required by customary international law, but generally governed by treaty
and subject to various limitations. A network of bilateral treaties, differing in detail but
having considerable similarity in principle and scope, has spelled out these limitations, and
in conjunction with state legislation, practice, and judicial decisions has created a body of
law with substantial uniformity in major respects. But the network of treaties has not
created a principle of customary law requiring extradition, and it is accepted that states are
not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty,” ID.
From the perspective of one commentator, “The history of extradition can be divided
into four periods: (1) ancient times to the seventeenth century — a period revealing an
almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and
half of the nineteenth century — a period of treaty-making chiefly concerning military
offenders characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) 1833 to 1948 — a
period of collective concern for suppressing common criminality; and (4) post 1948
developments which ushered in a greater concern for protecting human rights of persons and
revealed an awareness of the need to have international due process of law regulate
international relations,” BASSIOUNI at 33.
throughout history dating as far back as the time of Moses.5 By 1776, a notion had
evolved to the effect that “every state was obliged to grant extradition freely and
without qualification or restriction, or to punish a wrongdoer itself” and the absence
of intricate extradition procedures has been attributed to the predominance of this
simple principle of international law.6
Whether by practice’s failure to follow principle or by the natural evolution of
the principle, modern extradition treaties and practices began to emerge in this
country and elsewhere by the middle eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.7
Our first extradition treaty consisted of a single terse article in Jay’s Treaty of
1794 with Great Britain, but it contained several of the basic features of
contemporary extradition pacts. Article XXVII of the Treaty provided in its entirety,
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8 1 RESTATEMENT §475 at 559.
9 18 U.S.C. 3181 (“The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who
have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence
of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government”); 18 U.S.C. 3184 (“Whenever
there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and any foreign
government . . .”).
10 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) (“Valentine v. United
States ex rel. Neidecker, supra, 299 U.S., at 8-9. . . (United States may not extradite a citizen
in the absence of a statute or treaty obligation)” (emphasis added)).
“It is further agreed, that his Majesty and the United States, on mutual
requisitions, by them respectively, or by their respective ministers or officers
authorized to make the same, will deliver up to justice all persons, who, being
charged with murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of the other,
provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of criminality, as,
according to the laws of the place, where the fugitive or person so charged shall
be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the
offence had there been committed. The expense of such apprehension and
delivery shall be borne and defrayed, by those who make the requisition and
receive the fugitive,” 8 Stat. 116, 129 (1794).
Contemporary U.S. Treaties
Bars to Extradition
Extradition treaties are in the nature of a contract and by operation of
international law, “[a] state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply with
the request of another state party to that treaty to arrest and deliver a person duly
shown to be sought by that state (a) for trial on a charge of having committed a crime
covered by the treaty within the jurisdiction of the requesting state, or (b) for
punishment after conviction of such a crime and flight from that state, provided that
none of the grounds for refusal to extradite set forth in [the treaty] is applicable.”8
Subject to a contrary treaty provision, federal law defines the mechanism by
which we honor our extradition treaty obligations, 18 U.S.C. 3181 to 3196. Although
some countries will extradite in the absence of an applicable treaty as a matter of
comity, it was long believed that the United States could only grant an extradition
request if it could claim coverage under an existing extradition treaty, 18 U.S.C.
3181, 3184 (1994).9 Dicta in several court cases indicated that this requirement,
however, was one of congressional choice rather than constitutional requirement.10
No Treaty.
Congress appears to have acted upon that assumption when in 1996 it first
authorized the extradition of fugitive aliens even at the behest of a nation with whom
CRS-4
11 18 U.S.C. 3181(b)(“The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the
exercise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent
residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of
the United States in foreign countries without regard to the existence of any treaty of
extradition with such foreign government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that
— (1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the
offenses been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence as
defined under section 16 of this title; and (2) the offenses charged are not of a political
nature”).
12 18 U.S.C. 3181 note, Pub.L. 104-132, §443, 110 Stat. 1280 (1996).
13 “The Constitution calls for the Executive to make treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Throughout the history of this Republic, every extradition from the United
States has been accomplished under the terms of a valid treaty of extradition. In the instant
case, it is undisputed that no treaty exists between the United States and the Tribunal. This
is so even when, the Government insists, and the Court agrees, the Executive has the full
ability and right to negotiate such at a treaty. The absence of a treaty is a fatal defect in the
Government’s request that the Extraditee be surrendered. Without a treaty, this Court has
no jurisdiction to act, and Congress’ attempt to effectuate the Agreement in the absence of
a treaty is an unconstitutional exercise of power,” In re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988
F.Supp. 1038, 1042 (S.D.Tex. 1997), rev’d, Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 424-27
(5th Cir. 1999).
14 United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 168-72 (3d Cir. 1997); Then v.
Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 853-55 (9th Cir. 1996), see generally, ABBELL & RISTAU, at 52-3,
180-81.
we have no extradition treaty,11 and then by statute making the extradition procedures
applicable to requests from international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.12
The initial judicial response has left the vitality of those efforts somewhat in
doubt. A district court in Texas initially ruled that constitutional separation of
powers requirements precluded extradition in the absence of a treaty, but Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutional validity of extradition by statute rather
than treaty when it overturned the district court finding on appeal.13
A question has occasionally arisen over whether an extradition treaty with a
colonial power continues to apply a former colony becomes independent. Although
the United States periodically renegotiates replacements or supplements for existing
treaties to make contemporary adjustments, we have a number of treaties that pre-
date the dissolution of a colonial bond or some other adjustment in governmental
status. Fugitives in these situations have sometimes contested extradition on the
grounds that we have no valid extradition treaty with the successor government that
asks that they be handed over for prosecution. These efforts are generally
unsuccessful since successor governments will ordinarily have assumed the
extradition treaty obligations negotiated by their predecessors.14
No Treaty Crime.
Extradition is generally limited to crimes identified in the treaty. Early treaties
often recite a list of the specific extraditable crimes. Jay’s Treaty mentions only
murder and forgery; the inventory in our 1852 treaty with Prussia included eight
CRS-5
15 10 Stat. 964, 966 (1852)(“murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged papers, or the fabrication or
circulation of counterfeit money, whether coin or paper money, or the embezzlement of
public moneys”).
16 Section 203 of Public Law 105-323 purports to require construction of an extradition
treaty that permits extradition for kidnapping to authorize extradition for parental
kidnapping as well; the impact of section 203 remains to be seen.
others;15 and our 1974 treaty with Denmark identifies several dozen extradition
offenses:
1. murder; voluntary manslaughter; assault with intent to commit murder. 2. Aggravated injury
or assault; injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 3. Unlawful throwing or
application of any corrosive or injurious substances upon the person of another. with schemes
intended to deceive or defraud, or by any other fraudulent means. 4. Rape; indecent assault;
sodomy accompanied by use of force or threat; sexual intercourse and other unlawful sexual
relations with or upon children under the age specified by the laws of both the requesting and
the requested States. 5. Unlawful abortion. 6. Procuration; inciting or assisting a person under
21 years of age or at the time ignorant of the purpose in order that such person shall carry on
sexual immorality as a profession abroad or shall be used for such immoral purpose; promoting
of sexual immorality by acting as an intermediary repeatedly or for the purpose of gain; profiting
from the activities of any person carrying on sexual immorality as a profession. 7. Kidnaping;
child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment. 8. Robbery; assault with intent to rob. 9. Burglary.
10. Larceny. 11. Embezzlement. 12. Obtaining property, money or valuable securities: by false
pretenses or by threat or force, by defrauding any governmental body, the public or any person
by deceit, falsehood, use of the mails or other means of communication in connection. 13.
Bribery, including soliciting, offering and accepting. 14. Extortion. 15. Receiving or
transporting any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to have been
unlawfully obtained. 16. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator
or by a director or officer of any company. 17. An offense against the laws relating to
counterfeiting or forgery. 18. False statements made before a court or to a government agency
or official, including under United States law perjury and subornation of perjury. 19. Arson. 20.
An offense against any law relating to the protection of the life or health of persons from: a
shortage of drinking water; poisoned, contaminated, unsafe or unwholesome drinking water,
substance or products. 21. Any act done with intent to endanger the safety of any person
traveling upon a railway, or in any aircraft or vessel or bus or other means of transportation, or
any act which impairs the safe operation of such means of transportation. 22. Piracy; mutiny
or revolt on board an aircraft against the authority of the commander of such aircraft; any
seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, of an aircraft.
23. An offense against the laws relating to damage to property. 24. a. Offenses against the laws
relating to importation, exportation or transit of goods, articles, or merchandise. b. Offenses
relating to willful evasion of taxes and duties. c. Offenses against the laws relating to
international transfers of funds. 25. An offense relating to the: a. spreading of false intelligence
likely to affect the price of commodities, valuable securities or any other similar interests; or b.
making of incorrect or misleading statements concerning the economic conditions of such
commercial undertakings as joint-stock companies, corporations, co-operative societies or
similar undertakings through channels of public communications, in reports, in statements of
accounts or in declarations to the general meeting or any proper official of a company, in
notifications to, or registration with, any commission, agency or officer having supervisory or
regulatory authority over corporations, joint-stock companies, other forms of commercial
undertakings or in any invitation to the establishment of those commercial undertakings or to
the subscription of shares. 28. Unlawful abuse of official authority which results in grievous
bodily injury or deprivation of the life, liberty or property of any person, [or] attempts to
commit, conspiracy to commit, or participation in, any of the offenses mentioned in this Article,
Art. 3, 25 U.S.T. 1293 (1974).16
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17 E.g., Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 6,
2000)(“An offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both
Parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more than one year or by a more
severe penalty”); see also, Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1996); French Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb.
1, 2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Mar. 18,
1997); Jordanian Extradition Treaty , Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995);
and Italian Extradition Treaty, Art., ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3027 (1984).
Where an official citation is unavailable for particular treaty, we have used the Senate
Treaty Document citation along with the date upon which the treaty entered into force
according the State Department’s Treaties In Force (Aug. 2002). Beginning with the 104th
Congress, Senate Treaty Documents are available on the Government Printing Office’s
website, [http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress].
18 E.g., Italian Extradition Treaty, Art. V, §3 35 U.S.T. 3029 (1984) (“Extradition shall not
be granted for offenses under military law which are not offenses under ordinary criminal
law”). See generally, In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 676, 702-3 (N.D.Cal.
1988)(the military offense exception covers crimes like “mutiny and desertion which are
outside the realm of ordinary criminal law”); BASSIOUNI at 676-78; ABBELL & RISTAU at
116-17, 212-13.
19 Even then the political offense exception was thought more hospitable, except in the case
of desertion, see generally, Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32 ALBANY
LAW REVIEW 337 (1968).
20 See generally, BASSIOUNI, at 594-676; RESTATEMENT, §476, Comment g. & Reporters’
Notes 4-8; ABBELL & RISTAU at 199-212; Phillips, The Political Offense Exception and
Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposals for its Future, 15
DICKINSONJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONALLAW 337 (1997); The Political Offense Exception:
Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order, 63
GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 585 (1995).
21 Egyptian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, 19 Stat. 574 (1874)(“The provisions of this treaty
shall not apply to any crime or offence of a political character”).
While many of our extradition treaties continue to list specific extraditable
offenses, several of the more recent treaties simply make all felonies extraditable
(subject to other limitations found elsewhere in their various provisions).17
Military and Political Offenses.
In addition to an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted,
most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses for which
extradition may or must be denied. Common among these are provisions excluding
purely military and political offenses. The military crimes exception usually refers
to those offenses like desertion which have no equivalents in civilian criminal law.18
With the possible exception of selective service cases arising during the Vietnam
War period,19 application of the military offense exception appears to have been
infrequent and untroubled.
The political offense exception, however, has proven more troublesome.20 The
exception is and has been a common feature of extradition treaties for almost a
century and a half. In its traditional form, the exception is expressed in deceptively
simple terms.21 Yet it has been construed in a variety ways, more easily described in
CRS-7
22 Kostotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171 (1st Cir. 1991), citing, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d
504, 512 (7th Cir. 1981); Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980);
Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 807-9
(9th Cir. 1986); Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 689, 692 (1896); In re Extradition of Singh, 170
F.Supp.2d 982, 997 (E.D.Cal. 2001); Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
23 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996)(“For purposes of this Treaty, the following offenses shall not be considered to be
political offenses: a. a murder or other willful crime against the person of a Head of State
of one of the Contracting Parties, or a member of the Head of State’s family; . . . c. murder,
manslaughter, or other offense involving substantial bodily harm; d. an offense involving
kidnaping or any form of unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage; e. placing
or using an explosive, incendiary or destructive device capable of endangering life, of
causing substantial bodily harm, or of causing substantial property damage; and f. a
conspiracy or any type of association to commit offenses as specified in Article 2, paragraph
2, or attempt to commit, or participation in the commission of, any of the foregoing
offenses”); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art.5, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17,
1999)(murder or other offense against heads of state or their families; murder, manslaughter,
assault; kidnaping, abduction, hostage taking; bombing; or attempt or conspiracy to commit
any of those offenses); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art.4, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 10-10
(eff. Feb. 1, 2002)(virtually the same); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.4, ¶2, S. Treaty
Doc. 98-17, (eff. Oct. 11, 1991)(violent crimes against a Head of State or a member of his
or her family).
24 Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)
(“Extradition shall also not be granted if . . . (b) it is established that the request for
extradition, though purporting to be on account of the extraditable offence, is in fact made
for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions; or (c) the person sought is by reason of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, likely to be denied a fair trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty for such reasons” ); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 3, ¶(1)(c), S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“Extradition shall not
be granted when: . . . the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request was politically or racially motivated”); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.4, ¶3,
S. Treaty Doc. 105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999)(politically motivated); French Extradition
Treaty, Art.4, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002)(prosecution or punishment on
account of the fugitive’s “race, religion, nationality or political opinions”).
25 Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.4, ¶2(b), S. Treaty Doc. 98-17, (eff. Oct. 11, 1991);
Korean Extradition Treaty, Art. 4, ¶2(b), S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Indian
Extradition Treaty, Art.4, ¶2(b)-(g), S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 21, 1999); Hungarian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)(“For purposes of this
hindsight than to predicate beforehand. As a general rule, American courts require
that a fugitive seeking to avoid extradition “demonstrat[e] that the alleged crimes
were committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance such
as a war, revolution or rebellion.”22
Contemporary treaties often seek to avoid misunderstandings in a number of
ways. They expressly exclude terrorist offenses or other violent crimes from the
definition of political crimes for purposes of the treaty;23 they explicitly extend the
political exception to those whose prosecution is politically or discriminatorily
motivated;24 and/or they limit the reach of their political exception clauses to conform
to their obligations under multinational agreements.25
CRS-8
Treaty, the following offenses shall not be considered to be political offenses . . . an offense
for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral
international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their
competent authorities for decision as to prosecution”). The State Department has noted that
the list of crimes subject to such international agreements includes air piracy, aircraft
sabotage, crimes of violence committed against foreign dignitaries, hostage taking and
narcotics trafficking, Letter of Submittal, ID. at VI. Unless restricted in the Treaty, the list
apparently also includes genocide, war crimes, theft of nuclear materials, slavery, torture,
violence committed against the safety of maritime navigation or maritime platforms, theft
or destruction of national treasures, counterfeiting currency and bribery of foreign officials.
BASSIOUNI at 665-66;
26 SCHABAS,THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 239-45 (1997);
HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY, 240-47 (2d ed. 1996).
27 E.g., Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)
(“when the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in
the Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State,
the Requested State may refuse extradition unless the Requesting State provides such
assurances as the Requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty, if imposed,
shall not be carried out”); see also, Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. IV, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1996); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec.
9, 1996); South African Extradition Treaty, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25,
2001); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991).
Some capital punishment clauses do not apply in murder cases, see e.g., Extradition
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“When the
offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the
Requesting State and is not punishable by death under the laws in the Requested State, the
competent authority of the Requested State may refuse extradition unless: (a) the offense
constitutes murder under the laws in the Requested State; or (b) the competent authority of
the Requesting State provides such assurances as the competent authority of the Requested
State considers sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not
be carried out”); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May
17, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34 (eff. Jan. 12,
2001); see also, Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 230 (eff.
May 17, 1977).
28 BASSIOUNI at 735-44; ABBELL & RISTAU at 117-19, 295-6; International and Domestic
Approaches to Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and
Kindler Decisions, 34 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 225 (1996); Extradition, Human
Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a Person Charged
Capital Offenses.
A number of nations have abolished or abandoned capital punishment as a
sentencing alternative.26 Several of these have preserved the right to deny extradition
in capital cases either absolutely or in absence of assurances that the fugitive will not
be executed if surrendered.27 More than a few countries are reluctant to extradite in
a capital case even though their extradition treaty with the United State has no such
provision, based on opposition to capital punishment or to the methods and
procedures associated with execution bolstered by sundry multinational agreements
to which the United States is either not a signatory or has signed with pertinent
reservations.28
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with a Capital Crime, 25 CALIFORNIAWESTERNINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL 189 (1994).
29 1 RESTATEMENT, §476; United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1995).
Examples include the Italian Extradition Treaty, Art II, 35 U.S.T. 3027 (1984) (“An offense,
however denominated, shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws
of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or
by a more severe penalty. . .”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty
Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.
105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 2, 35 U.S.T. 3201
(1973); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996);
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Bolivian
Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Extradition
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Extradition
Treaty with Thailand, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991).
30 In re Extradition of Loharoia, 932 F.Supp. 802, 810 (N.D.Tex. 1996) (“The principle is
a general policy of extradition, and arguably applies even absent explicit inclusion in the
treaty in question. See, Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58 (1903); Bauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d
843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980). On the other hand, there is authority suggesting that the principle
does not apply unless it is expressly stated in the treaty. See, Factor [v. Laubenheimer], 290
U.S. [276], at 287-90 [(1933)]”).
31 Soma, Muther, & Brissette, Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes; Are New
Treaties and Laws Needed? 34 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 317, 324 (1997).
32 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922); Gallo-Chamorro v. United States, 233 F.3d
1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1998); DeSilva
v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d at 1113; LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1112 (2d Cir.
1996); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Extradition of
Platko, 213 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1236 (S.D.Cal. 2002); see generally, Test of “Dual
Criminality” Where Extradition to or From Foreign Nation Is Sought, 132 ALR FED 525
(1996 & Oct. 2002 Supp.).
33 International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW 191, 207 (“The current state of the law appears
Want of Dual Criminality.
“Under most international agreements . . . [a] person sought for prosecution or
for enforcement of a sentence will not be extradited . . . (c) if the offense with which
he is charged or of which he has been convicted is not punishable as a serious crime
in both the requesting and requested state. . .”29
Although there is a split of authority over whether dual criminality resides in all
extradition treaties that do not deny its application,30 the point is largely academic
since it is a common feature of all American extradition treaties.31 Subject to varying
interpretations, the United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to
honor an extradition request if possible. Thus, dual criminality does not “require that
the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall be same; nor that
the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the
two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both
jurisdictions.”32 When a foreign country seeks to extradite a fugitive from the United
States dual criminality may be satisfied by reference to either federal or state law.33
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to be that if the offense is considered criminal under federal law, the law of the asylum
State, or under the law of the preponderance of States, the dual criminal requirement is
satisfied”); Test of Dual Criminality Where Extradition From Foreign Nations Is Sought,
132 ALR FED. at 539-40.
34 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions prohibit
acquisition or operation of an interstate commercial enterprise through the patterned
commission of various other “predicate” offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1961 to 1966. The Continuing
Criminal Enterprise (CCE) or drug kingpin provisions, 21 U.S.C. 848, outlaw management
of a large drug trafficking operation. Along with attempt, conspiracy and federal crimes
with distinctive jurisdictional elements, they pose difficulties when they approximate but
do not exactly matching the elements for extraditable offenses. They present a distinct
problem, however, when they are based entirely on predicate offenses that are not
themselves extraditable offenses. BASSIOUNI at 504-11; RICO, CCE, and International
Extradition, 62 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW 1281 (1989).
35 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶3.b., S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996) (“For the purpose of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense . . .
whether or not the offense is one for which United States federal law requires the showing
of such matters as interstate transportation or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the purpose of establishing
jurisdiction in a United States federal court”); see also, Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.2,
¶4(c), S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.2, ¶3(b),
S. Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Korean Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶3(c), S.
Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999).
36 E.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept.
22, 1994)(“An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an attempt or a
conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting, counselling, causing or procuring the commission
of, or being an accessory before or after the fact to, an [extraditable] offense. . .”);
Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov.
29, 1999); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995)(“An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an attempt or a
conspiracy to commit, or participation in the commission of, an [extraditable] offense. . .”);
Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art.2, ¶1(a), (b), S. Treaty Doc. 105-10 (eff. Feb. 1,
2002); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. III, ¶2, 28 U.S.T. 230
(1977)(“Extradition shall also be granted for any attempt or conspiracy to commit an
[extraditable] offense . . .”).
37 E.g., South African Extradition Treaty, Art. 2 ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25,
2001)(“Where extradition of a person is sought for an offense against a law relating to
taxation, customs duties, exchange control, or other revenue matters, extradition may not
be refused on the ground that the law of the Requested State does not impose the same kind
of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, customs duty, or exchange regulation of the same
kinds as the law of the Requesting State”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4(B), S.
Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Korean Extradition Treaty, Art.2, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc.
106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff.
Our treaty partners do not always construe dual criminality requirements as
broadly. In the past, some have been unable to find equivalents for attempt,
conspiracy, RICO, CCE, and crimes with prominent federal jurisdictional elements.34
Many modern extradition treaties contain provisions addressing the problem of
jurisdictional elements35 and/or making extraditable attempt or conspiracy to commit
an extraditable offense.36 Some include special provisions for tax and customs
offenses as well.37
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Sept. 17, 1999); but see, Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 5, S. Treaty Doc. 105-10
(eff. Feb. 1, 2002) (“The executive authority of the Requested State shall have discretion to
deny extradition when the offense for which extradition is requested is a fiscal offense [i.e.,
purely a tax, customs, or currency offense]”).
38 ABBELL & RISTAU at 64-7, 278-80.
39 Even among countries with a fairly expansive view of the extraterritorial jurisdiction,
there may be substantial differences between the perceptions of common law countries and
those of civil law countries, Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH LAW REVIEW 685.
40 E.g., Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. II, ¶3(b), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21,
1966) (“To determine . . . whether an offense is punishable under the laws in the Requested
State, it shall be irrelevant . . . where the act or acts constituting the offense were
committed”); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995) (“An offense described in this Article shall be an extraditable offense regardless of
where the act or acts constituting the offense were committed”); Austrian Extradition
Treaty, Art.2, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Indian Extradition Treaty, Art.2,
¶1(4) (eff. July 21, 1999); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art.2, ¶1(4), S. Treaty Doc.
105-10, (eff. Feb. 1, 2002).
41 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“If the offense has been committed outside the territory of the Requesting State, extradition
shall be granted if the laws of the Requested State provide for the punishment of an offense
committed outside of its territory in similar circumstances. If the laws of the Requested
State do not so provide, the executive authority of the Requested State may, in its discretion
grant extradition”); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17
(eff. Sept. 22, 1994)(“An offense described in this Article shall be an extraditable offense
whether or not the offense was committed within the territory of the Requesting State.
However, if the offense was committed outside the territory of the Requesting State,
extradition shall be granted if the law of the Requested State provides for punishment of an
offense committed outside of its territory in similar circumstances”); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art III, 35 U.S.T. 3028 (1984) (“When an offense has been committed outside the
territory of the Requesting Party, the Requested Party shall have the power to grant
extradition if its laws provide for the punishment of such an offense or if the person sought
is a national of the Requesting Party”); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 2, ¶2, 35
Extraterritoriality.
As a general rule, crimes are defined by the laws of the place where they are
committed. There have always been exceptions to this general rule under which a
nation was understood to have authority to outlaw and punish conduct occurring
outside the confines of its own territory. Historically, our extradition treaties applied
to crimes “committed within the [territorial] jurisdiction” of the country seeking
extradition.38 Largely as a consequence of terrorism and drug trafficking, however,
the United States now claims more sweeping extraterritorial application for our
criminal laws than recognized either in our more historic treaties or by many of
today’s governments.39 Here, our success in eliminating extradition impediments by
negotiating new treaty provisions has been mixed. More than a few call for
extradition regardless of where the offense was committed.40 Yet perhaps an equal
number of contemporary treaties permit or require denial of an extradition request
that falls within an area where the countries hold conflicting views on extraterritorial
jurisdiction.41
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U.S.T. 3206 (1973)(“. . . When the offense for which extradition has been requested has
been committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, extradition may be granted if
the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in
similar circumstances”); French Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff.
Feb. 1, 2002)(“Extradition shall be granted for an extraditable offense committed outside
the territory of the Requesting State, when the laws of the requested Party authorize the
prosecution or provide the punishment of that offense in similar circumstances”).
42 1 RESTATEMENT, §475, Reporters’ Note 4.
43 The Supreme Court in Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936),
held that a national exemption clause that denied an obligation to extradition denied the
United States the authority to honor a treaty request to surrender an American. Congress
sought to reverse the result with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. 3196 (“If the applicable treaty
or convention does not obligate the United States to extradite its citizens to a foreign
country, the Secretary of State may, nevertheless, order the surrender to that country of a
United States citizen whose extradition has been requested by that country if the other
requirements of that treaty or convention are met”). At least two lower federal courts have
held that the statute grants the government authority to extradite an American, Hilario v.
United States, 854 F.2d 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F.Supp. 241 (E.D.Pa.
1992); see also, Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1325-326 (9th Cir. 1997)(section
3196 and a treaty provision stating that the parties “may” extradite their own nationals
affords to the Secretary of State discretion).
44 BASSIOUNI at 683-84; ABBELL & RISTAU at 67-71, 186-87, 280-81.
45 Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
Extradition Treaty with Belize, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. Mar. 20, 2000); South
African Extradition Treaty, Art.3, S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff. June 25, 2001); Extradition
Nationality.
The right of a country to refuse to extradite one’s own nationals is probably the
greatest single obstacle to extradition. The United States has long objected to the
impediment42 and recent treaties indicate that its hold may not be as formidable as
was once the case. At one time it was fair to say that “United States extradition
treaties contained generally three types of such provisions. The first does not refer
to nationals specifically, but agrees to the extradition of all persons. Judicial
construction, as well as executive interpretation, of such clauses have consistently
held that the word `person’ includes nationals, and therefore refusal to surrender a
fugitive because he is a national cannot be justified . . . . The second and most
common type of treatyprovision provides that `neither of the contracting parties shall
be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects . . . .’ [Congress has enacted
legislation to overcome judicial construction that precluded the United States from
surrendering an American under such provision.43] The third type of treaty provision
states that ‘neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own
citizens under the stipulations of this convention, but the executive authority of each
shall have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper do
so.’”44
These basic three have been joined by a number of variants. A growing number
go so far as to declare that “Extradition shall not be refused on the ground that the
fugitive is a citizen or national of the Requested State.”45 Another form limits the
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Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 4, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art IV, 35 U.S.T. 3028 (1983); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 4, 35 U.S.T.
3206 (1973).
46 Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶1(b), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966)
(“Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition
request refers to . . . (b) murder; voluntary manslaughter; kidnaping; aggravated assault;
rape; sexual offenses involving children; armed robbery; offenses related to the illicit traffic
in controlled substances; serious offenses related to terrorism; serious offenses related to
organized criminal activity; fraud against the government or involving multiple victims;
counterfeiting of currency; offenses related to the traffic in historical or archeological items;
offenses punishable in both States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least
ten years; or (c) an attempt or conspiracy, participation in, or association regarding the
commission of any of the offenses described in subparagraphs (a) and (b)”).
47 Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶1(a), S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966)
(“Neither Party shall be obligated to extradite its own nationals, except when the extradition
request refers to: (a) offenses as to which there is an obligation to establish criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to multilateral international treaties in force with respect to the
Parties”).
48 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 3, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)
(“If extradition is refused solely on the basis of the nationality of the person sought, the
Requested State shall, at the request of the Requesting State, submit the case to its
authorities for prosecution”); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.3, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-16
(eff. Sept. 14, 1999); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. III, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1966); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May
17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11,
1991); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. VII, ¶¶2, 3, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7,
1991)(but also requiring extradition if a fugitive is a national of both the Requesting and
Requested State).
49 BASSIOUNI at 693-707; ABBELL & RISTAU at 96-100, 192-98, 290-93.
50 Italian Extradition Treaty, Art VI, 35 U.S.T. 3030 (1984) (“Extradition shall not be
granted when the person sought has been convicted, acquitted or pardoned, or has served
the sentence imposed, by the Requested Party for the same act for which extradition is
requested”); Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. V, ¶1(a), 28 U.S.T. 230
(1977) (“Extradition shall not be granted if: (a) the person sought would, if proceeded
nationality exemption to nonviolent crimes;46 a third allows a conflicting obligation
under a multinational agreement to wash the exemption away.47 Even where the
exemption is preserved, contemporary treaties more regularly refer to the obligation
to consider prosecution at home of those nationals whose extradition has been
refused.48
Double Jeopardy.
Depending on the treaty, extradition may also be denied on the basis of a
number of procedural considerations. Double punishment and/or double jeopardy
(also know as non bis in idem) clauses are among these.49 The more historic clauses
are likely to bar extradition for a second prosecution of the “same acts” or the “same
event” rather than the more narrowly drawn “same offenses.”50 The new model
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against in the territory of the requested Party for the offense for which his extradition is
requested, be entitled to be discharged on the grounds of a previous acquittal or conviction
in the territory of the requesting or requested Party or of a third State”).
51 E.g., Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. V, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966)
(“Extradition shall not be granted when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted
in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is requested. Extradition shall
not be precluded by the fact that the authorities of the Requested State have decided to
refrain from prosecuting the person sought for the acts for which extradition is requested or
to discontinue any criminal proceedings which have been initiated against the person sought
for those acts.”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34
(eff. Jan. 12, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art.5, S. Treaty Doc.
105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 5, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty
Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 5, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty
Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995). Some include language to avoid confusion over whether
an American dismissal with prejudice is the same as an acquittal, Hungarian Extradition
Treaty, Art. 5, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996) (“Extradition shall not be granted
when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed by court order
with finding and final effect in the Requested State for the offense for which extradition is
requested”).
52 E.g., Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art.7, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
French Extradition Treaty, Art.8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002).
53 E.g., Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 7, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000);
Indian Extradition Treaty, Art.7, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 212, 1999); Extradition
Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Hungarian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art VII, 35 U.S.T. 3030 (1983).
54 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 5, ¶3, 35 U.S.T. 3207 (1973); see also,
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Extradition
Treaty with the United Kingdom, Art. V, ¶1(b), 28 U.S.T. 230 (1977).
55 1 RESTATEMENT §476, Comment e; see also, BASSIOUNI at 707-12; ABBELL & RISTAU
at 94-6, 187-90, 289-90.
limits the exemption to fugitives who have been convicted or acquitted of the same
offense and specificallydenies the exemption where an initial prosecution has simply
been abandoned.51
Lapse of Time.
Lapse of time or statute of limitation clauses are prevalent as well. “Many
[states] . . . preclude extradition if prosecution for the offense charged, or
enforcement of the penalty, has become barred by lapse of time under the applicable
law. Under some treaties the applicable law is that of the requested state,52 in others
that of the requesting state;53 under some treaties extradition is precluded if either
state’s statute of limitations has run.54 . . . When a treaty provides for a time-bar only
under the law of the requesting state, or only under the law of the requested state,
United States courts have generally held that time-bar of the state not mentioned does
not bar extradition. If the treaty contains no reference to the effect of a lapse of time
neither state’s statute of limitations will be applied.”55 Left unsaid is the fact that
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56 E.g., Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 6, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)
(“The decision whether to grant the request for extradition shall be made without regard to
provisions of the law of either Contracting State concerning lapse of time”); Extradition
Treaty with Belize, Art.8,106-38 (eff. Mar. 21, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.7,
S. Treaty Doc.105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999).
57 U.S.Const. Amends. V, XIV; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977);
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982);United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farmer, 312 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2003).
58 U.S.Const. Amends. VI, XIV; Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 774
(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2003).
59 “[T]hrough the diplomatic channel” seems to be the phrase favored most recently, see
e.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996)(“All
requests for extradition shall be made through the diplomatic channel”); Polish Extradition
Treaty, Art.9, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Korean Extradition Treaty,
Art. 8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas,
Art. 8, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art.
8 ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. VI, ¶1, S.
Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art. X, 35 U.S.T. 3031
(1983); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 10, ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3210 (1973).
60 Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8 ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995)(“2. All requests shall contain: (a) documents, statements, photographs (if possible),
or other types of information which describe the identity, nationality, and probable location
of the person sought; (b) information describing the facts of the offense and the procedural
history of the case; (c) the text of the law describing the essential elements of the offense
for which extradition is requested; (d) the text of the law prescribing the punishment for the
offense; and (e) the documents, statements, or other types of information specified in
paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of this Article, as applicable.”); 3. A request for extradition of
a person who is sought for prosecution shall also contain: (a) a copy of the warrant or order
of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; (b) a copy of the charging
documents; and (c) such information as would provide a reasonable basis to believe that the
person sought committed the offense for which extradition is requested. 4. A request for
extradition relating to a person who has been found guilty of the offense for which
extradition is sought shall also contain: (a) a copy of the judgment of conviction or, if such
copy is not available, a statement by a judicial authority that the person has been found
guilty; (b) information establishing that the person sought is the person to whom the finding
some treaties declare in no uncertain terms that the passage of time is no bar to
extradition.56
In cases governed by American law and in instances of American prosecution
following extradition, applicable statutes of limitation and due process determine
whether pre-indictment delays bar prosecution57 and speedy trial provisions govern
whether post-indictment delays preclude prosecution.58
Procedure for Extradition from the United States
A foreign country will ordinarily initiate the extradition process with a request
submitted to the State Department59 along with the documentation required by the
treaty.60 The Secretary of State, at his discretion, has the matter forwarded to the
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of guilt refers; (c) a copy of the sentence imposed, if the person sought has been sentenced,
and a statement establishing to what extent the sentence has been carried out; and (d) in the
case of a person who has been found guilty in absentia, the documents required in paragraph
3"); see also, South African Extradition Treaty, Art.9, ¶¶2, 3 & 4 S. Treaty Doc. 106-24 (eff.
June 25, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-
10 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S. Treaty Doc.
104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 8, ¶¶2, 3, & 4, S.
Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. VI, ¶¶2-6, S.
Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1996).
61 “Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and
any foreign government, or in cases arising under section 3181(b), any justice or judge of
the United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or
any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint
made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by
such treaty or convention . . . issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so
charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered,” 18 U.S.C. 3184; see generally,
ABBELL & RISTAU at 159-71.
62 Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 10, ¶¶1, 2, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991)(“In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of any
accused or convicted person. Application for provisional arrest shall be made through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Department of Justice . . . and the Ministry of
Interior in Thailand . . . . (2) The application shall contain: a description of the person
sought; the location of that person, if known; a brief statement of the facts of the case
including, if possible, the time and location of the offense; a statement of the existence of
a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction against that person . . . and a statement that
a request for extradition of the person will follow”). Such provisions usually also call for
the release of the fugitive upon the failure to submit a formal request within a designated
period of time, e.g., id., Art. 10 ¶4 (60 days); Argentine Extradition Treaty (60 days), Art.
11, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Korean Extradition Treaty (two months),
Art. 10, ¶4, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Hungarian Extradition Treaty (60
days), Art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas (60 days), Art. 10, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty (60 days with a possible 30-day extension), Art. 11, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3
(eff. July 29, 1995); Bolivian Extradition Treaty (60 days), Art. VIII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Italian Extradition Treaty (45 days), Art. XII, 35 U.S.T. 3034-35
(1984); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay (45 days), Art. 11, ¶1, 35 U.S.T. 3212-213 (1973).
Department of Justice which begins the procedure, ordinarily as described in 18
U.S.C. 3184, for the arrest of the fugitive “to the end that the evidence of criminality
may be heard and considered.”61
Arrest and Bail.
Extradition treaties sometimes permit requests for the provisional arrest of a
fugitive prior to delivery of a formal request for extradition.62 Regardless of whether
detention occurs pursuant to provisional arrest, as a consequence of the initiation of
an extradition hearing or upon certification of extradition, the fugitive is not entitled
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63 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 61-3 (1903)(no bail following certification absent special
circumstances); United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1996) (no bail
during pendency of extradition proceedings absent special circumstances); In re Requested
Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 1996) (release on bail pending the
completion of extradition hearings requires special circumstances); Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136
F.Supp.2d 125, 128-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Hababou v. Albright, 82 F.Supp.2d 347, 349-52
(D.N.J. 2000); see also, In re Extradition of Molnar, 182 F.Supp.2d 684, 686-89 (N.D.Ill.
2002)(suggesting it may be easier to demonstrate special circumstances following
provisional arrest than after a formal request has been presented); Parretti v. United States,
122 F.3d 758, 786 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that the strong presumption against bail be
abandoned), opinion withdraw upon the flight of the respondent, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir.
1998); International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STANFORD JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (1998).
64 See e.g., Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 12, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11,
1991)(“A person detained pursuant to the Treaty shall not be released until the extradition
request has been finally decided, unless such release is required under the extradition law
of the Requested State or unless this Treaty provides for such release”).
65 In re Extradition of Valdez-Mainero, 3 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1114-115 (S.D.Cal. 1998),
citing, Bassiouni, at Ch. IX, §5.1; see also, ABBELL & RISTAU at 172-241; cf., Cheung v.
United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)(“The judicial officer’s inquiry is confined to
the following: whether a valid treaty exists, whether the crime charged is covered by the
relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for
extradition is sufficient under the applicable standard of proof”); In re Extradition of Salas,
161 F.Supp.2d 915, 923 (N.D.Ill. 2001).
to release on bail exception under rare “special circumstances.”63 This limited
opportunity for pre-extradition release may be further restricted under the applicable
treaty.64
Hearing.
The precise menu for an extradition hearing is dictated by the applicable
extradition treaty, but a common check list for a hearing conducted in this country
would include determinations that:
“1. There exists a valid extradition treaty between the United States and the
requesting state;
2. The relator is the person sought;
3. The offense charged is extraditable;
4. The offense charged satisfies the requirement of double criminality;
5. There is `probable cause’ to believe the relator committed the offense
charged;
6. The documents required are presented in accordance with United States
law, subject to any specific treaty requirements, translated and duly
authenticated . . . ; and
7. Other treaty requirements and statutory procedures are followed.”65
An extradition hearing is not, however, “in the nature of a final trial by which
the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him. . . .
Instead, it is essentially a preliminary examination to determine whether a case is
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66 LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1996)(internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting, Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888); Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 316 (1922); and Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also,
DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Extradition of Molnar,
202 F.Supp.2d 782, 786 (N.D.Ill. 2002).
67 DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997)(legal custodian defense to
kidnaping charge), citing, Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), and Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309 (1922); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997)(due process bar
to criminal trial of incompetent defendant); In re Extradition of Schweidenback, 3 F.Supp.2d
113, 117 (D.Mass. 1998)(evidence related to a defense is excludable); In re Extradition of
Diaz Medina, 210 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (N.D.Tex. 2002).
68 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997); Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d
851, 855 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 188F.Supp.2d 921, 932
(N.D.Ill. 2002); F.R.CRIM.P. 54(b)(5), F.R.EVID. 1101(d)(3).
69 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997), citing, Collins v. Loisel,
259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922); In re Extradition of Platko, 213 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1237 (S.D.Cal.
2002).
70 In re Extradition of Powell, 4 F.Supp.2d 945, 951-52 (S.D.Cal. 1998); Valenzuela v.
United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002)(noting that even compelled statements
that incriminate the fugitive under the laws of the requesting country would be admissible
in an extradition hearing); cf., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998)(the Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit compelled statements simply because they are incriminating
under the laws of a foreign nation).
71 Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994); McMaster v. United States, 9 F.3d
47, 49 (8th Cir. 1993); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993); Bovio v.
United States, 989 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1993); Sabatier v. Daborwski, 586 F.2d 866, 869
(1st Cir. 1978); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 n.9 (2d Cir. 1976); In re
Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 188F.Supp.2d 921, 932 (N.D.Ill. 2002)(internal citations
omitted)(“the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth Amendment right
against undue delay are inapplicable to an extradition. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right
to effective counsel does not apply to extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court has
found no constitutional infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been
denied an opportunity to confront their accusers. Finally, the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy and the right to a Miranda warning are inapplicable to an
made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the
demanding nation. . . . The judicial officer who conducts an extradition hearing thus
performs an assignment in line with his or her accustomed task of determining if
there is probable cause to hold a defendant to answer for the commission of an
offense.”66
The purpose of the hearing is in part to determine whether probable cause exists
to believe that the individual committed an offense covered by the extradition treaty.
The individual may offer evidence to contradict or undermine the existence of
probable causes, but affirmative defenses that might be available at trial are
irrelevant.67 The rules of criminal procedure and evidence that would apply at trial
have no application;68 hearsay is not only admissible but may be relied upon
exclusively;69 the Miranda rule has no application;70 initiation of extradition may be
delayed without regard for the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or the Fifth
Amendment right of due process;71 nor does the Sixth Amendment right to the
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extradition proceeding”).
72 DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1999).
73 Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229-230 (11th Cir. 2002).
74 In re Extradition of Cheung, 968 F.Supp. 791, 798-99 (D.Conn, 1997)(“The rule of non-
inquiry is well-established in the circuits and has been applied in extraditions to a panoply
of nations. Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1993)(Canada); Koskotas v. Rocke,
931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991)(Greece); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986
(U.K.); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981)(Israel); Escobedo v. United States, 623
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980)(Mexico) . . .”); see also, Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322,
1327 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997); United
States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995)(explaining the exception in the U.K.
Supplementary Treaty); see also, Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the
Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
1198 (1991).
Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), declined to depart from the rule but
observed that under some circumstance an extraditee might face “procedures or punishments
so antipathetic to a federal court’s sense of decency as to require re-examination” of the
question. The courts appear to have rarely if ever encountered such procedures or
punishments, In re Extradition of Marinero, 990 F.Supp. 1208, 1230 (S.D.Cal. 1997)(“There
is no legal support for a judicially created `humanitarian exception’ [of the type foreseen in
Gallina] in an extradition proceeding”); In re Extradition of Sandhu, 886 F.Supp. 318, 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)(“The `Gallina exception’ to the rule of non-inquiry has yet to be applied”);
Corneljo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000)(“Our research failed to
identify any case in which this [humanitarian exception] has been applied . . . .”).
75 Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829-30 (11th Cir. 1993), quoting, Neely v. Henkel, 180
U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
76 Gill v. Imundi, 747 F.Supp. 1028, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), citing, In re Doherty, 786 F.2d
491, 503 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Extradition of Massieu, 897 F.Supp. 176, 179 (D.N.J. 1995);
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1978), citing inter alia, Collins v. Loisel, 262
U.S. 426 (1923); ABBELL & RISTAU at 252-54.
assistance of counsel apply.72 Due process, however, will bar extradition of
informants whom the government promised confidentiality and then provided the
evidence necessary to establish probable cause for extradition.73
Moreover, extradition will ordinarilybe certified without “examining requesting
country’s criminal justice system or taking into account the possibility that the
extraditee will be mistreated if returned.”74 This “non-inquiry rule” is premised on
the view that, “[w]hen an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he
cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment
as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode
be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.”75
Review.
If at the conclusion of the extradition hearing, the court concludes there is some
obstacle to extradition and refuses to certify the case, “[t]he requesting government’s
recourse to an unfavorable disposition is to bring a new complaint before a different
judge or magistrate, a process it may reiterate apparently endlessly.”76
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77 Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997), citing, Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364,
369 (1920); Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 1998); ABBELL & RISTAU at 243-
52.
Under some circumstances, an individual subject to an extradition order may appeal
under the Administrative Procedures Act when to surrender him would be contrary to our
obligations under the Torture Convention as implement by statute and regulation, Cornejo-
Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1010-15 (9th Cir. 2000).
78 DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997), quoting Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th
Cir. 2002); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2000); Sidali v.
I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1997); Smith v. United States, 82 F.3d 964, 965 (10th Cir.
1996).
79 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1997), citing, Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1997);
and Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996); Valenzuela v. United States, 286
F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2002).
80 United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)(“It is then within the
Secretary of State’s sole discretion to determine whether or not the relator should actually
be extradited. See 18 U.S.C. §3186 (`The Secretary of State may order the person
committed under section 3184 . . . of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such
foreign government . . .’”); Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUMBIALAWREVIEW
1313 (1962).
81 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 11, ¶3, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991)(“If the extradition has been granted, surrender of the person sought shall take place
within such time as may be prescribed by the laws of the Requested State. The competent
authorities of the Contracting Parties shall agree on the time and place of the surrender of
the person sought. If, however, that person is not removed from the territory of the
Requested State within the prescribed time, that person may be set at liberty and the
Requested State may subsequently refuse extradition for the same offense”); Argentine
Extradition Treaty, Art.12, ¶6, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000); Austrian
Extradition Treaty, Art.14, ¶¶2, 3, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50 (eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Hungarian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Costa Rican
If the court concludes there is no such obstacle to extradition and certifies to the
Secretary of State that the case satisfies the legal requirements for extradition, the
fugitive has no right of appeal, but may be entitled to limited review under habeas
corpus.77 “[H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had
jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat
liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there
was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”78 In this last assessment,
appellate courts will only “examine the magistrate judge’s determination of probable
cause to see if there is `any evidence’ to support it.”79
Surrender.
If the judge or magistrate certifies the fugitive for extradition, the matter then
falls to the discretion of the Secretary of State to determine whether as a matter of
policy the fugitive should be released or surrendered to the agents of the country that
has requested his or her extradition.80 The procedure for surrender, described in
treaty81 and statute,82 calls for the release of the prisoner if he or she is not claimed
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Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jamaican Extradition
Treaty, Art. IX, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty,
Art. IX, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 12,
S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XIII, 35 U.S.T.
3036 (1984).
82 18 U.S.C. 3186 (“The Secretary of State may order the person committed under sections
3184 or 3185 of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign
government, to be tried for the offense of which charged. Such agent may hold such person
in custody, and take him to the territory of such foreign government, pursuant to such treaty.
A person so accused who escapes may be retaken in the same manner as any person accused
of any offense”).
83 18 U.S.C. 3188 (“Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign
government to remain until delivered up in pursuance of a requisition, is not so delivered
up and conveyed out of the United States within two calendar months after such
commitment, over and above the time actually required to convey the prisoner from the jail
to which he was committed, by the readiest way, out of the United States, any judge of the
United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by or on behalf of the person
so committed, and upon proof made to him that reasonable notice of the intention to make
such application has been given to the Secretary of State, may order the person so committed
to be discharged out of custody, unless sufficient cause is shown to such judge why such
discharge ought not to be ordered.”)
84 E.g., Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996) (“If
the Requested State receives requests from the other Contracting Party and from any other
State or States for the extradition of the same person, either for the same offense or for
different offenses, the executive authority of the Requested State shall determine to which
State it will surrender the person. In making its decision, the Requested State shall consider
all relevant factors, including but not limited to: a. whether the requests were made pursuant
to treaty; b. the place where the offense was committed; c. the respective interests of the
Requesting States; d. the gravity of the offense; e. the nationality of the victim; f. the
possibility of further extradition between the Requesting State; and g. the chronological
order in which the requests were received from the Requesting States”); Extradition Treaty
with Trinidad and Tobago, Art.12, S Treaty Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Polish
Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Extradition Treaty
with Thailand, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition
Treaty, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art.
XIII, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with the Uruguay, Art. 14,
35 U.S.T. 3214-215 (1973); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. X, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1966); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29,
1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XV, 35 U.S.T. 3037 (1984).
85 E.g., Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XII, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991) (“If
the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is being prosecuted or is
serving a sentence in the territory of the Requested State for a different offence, the
Requesting State shall, unless its laws otherwise provide, defer the surrender of the person
sought until the conclusion of the proceedings against that person or the full execution of
any punishment that may be or may have been imposed”); Extradition Treaty with Sri
within a specified period of time,83 often indicates how extradition requests from
more than one country for the same fugitive are to be handled,84 and frequently
allows the fugitive to be held for completion of a trial or the service of a criminal
sentence before being surrendered.85
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Lanka, Art.13, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 106-34 (eff. Jan. 12, 2001); French Extradition Treaty,
Art. 16, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art.
14, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 12, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 14, S. Treaty
Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XI, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 13, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July
29, 1995); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XIV, 35 U.S.T. 3036-37 (1984).
86 Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F.Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vac’d on juris. grounds, 82 F.3d
1081 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
87 In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1998), redesignated
after rehearing, In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2001); LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d
1100, 1105-10 (2d Cir. 1996); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also, Noel v. United States, 12 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1304-305 (M.D.Fla. 1998); In re
Extradition of Lehming, 951 F.Supp. 505, 508-9 (D.Del. 1996); Sandhu v. Bransom, 932
F.Supp. 822, 826 (N.D.Tex. 1996); Werner v. Hickey, 920 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (M.D.Cal.
1996); see also, Innocence Abroad: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of International
Extradition, 33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1997).
88 RESTATEMENT, §478, Comment e (“Requests for extradition of persons from foreign
states may be made only by the Department of State. If the offense with which the person
is charged or of which he has been convicted is one under federal law, the application for
extradition must be submitted by the prosecutor to the Department of Justice, which will
review the documents and, if satisfied of their sufficiency, transmit them to the Department
of State for forwarding to the requested state. If the offense is one under [the law of any of
the states of the United States], the application must be submitted by or with the
endorsement of the Governor of the State, and must be reviewed by the Department of
Justice before transmission to the Department of State. If the State Department is satisfied
that the conditions for extradition under the applicable treaty have been met, it will request
extradition in the name of the United States, and, where appropriate, will arrange for
representation of the United States at the proceedings in the requested state. When
extradition proceedings in the foreign state have been completed and the person sought has
been certified to be extraditable, the Secretary or [her] authorized deputy may issue a
warrant to federal or State officials to act as agents of the United States for the purpose of
taking custody of the person in the requested state for return to the United States.”)
Constitutionality
The fact that the extradition turns on the discretion of the Secretary of State
following judicial certification has led to the suggestion that the procedure
established by the extradition statute is constitutionally offensive to the separation
of powers, first broached by a district court in the District of Columbia,86 but
subsequently rejected by every appellate court to consider the question.87
Trial in the United States: Extradition Issues
The laws of the country of refuge and the applicable extradition treaty govern
extradition back to the United States of a fugitive located overseas. The request for
extradition comes from the Department of State whether extradition is sought for trial
in federal or state court or whether for execution of a criminal sentence under federal
or state law.88 The issues of treaty application by the authorities to whom the request
is made — extraditable offenses, dual criminality, and the like — are the same as
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89 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992), quoting, United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886); see also, United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 626
(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.
Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2002); Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the
Federal Courts: Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1993); Application of Doctrine of Specialty to Federal Criminal
Prosecution of Accused Extradited from Foreign Country, 112 ALR FED. 473 (1993 & Oct.
2002 Supp.); BASSIOUNI at 511-69; ABBELL & RISTAU at 331-35.
90 Although the wording varies, the content of these provisions roughly corresponds to
those in the Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XIV, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7,
1991)(“(1) A person extradited under this Treaty may only be detained, tried or punished
in the Requesting State for the offence for which extradition is granted, or (a) for a lesser
offence proved by the facts before the court of committal . . . (b) for an offence committed
after the extradition; or (c) for an offence in respect to which the executive authority of the
Requested State . . . consents to the person’s detention, trial or punishment. . . or (d) if the
person (i) having left the territory of the Requesting State after his extradition, voluntarily
returns to it; or (ii) being free to leave the territory of the Requesting State after his
extradition, does not so leave within forty-five (45) days . . . . (2) A person extradited under
this Treaty may not be extradited to a third State unless (a) the Requested State consents;
or (b) the circumstances are such that he could have been dealt with in the Requesting State
pursuant to sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph (1)”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Belize,
Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 106-38 (eff. March 21, 2001); Polish Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, S.
Treaty Doc. 105-14 (eff. Sept. 17, 1999); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 13, 35
U.S.T. 3213-214 (1973); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff.
Dec. 9, 1996); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966);
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 14, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994);
Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 16, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Costa
Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 16, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Italian
Extradition Treaty, Art XVI, 35 U.S.T. 3038 (1984).
91 Gallo-Chamorro, 233 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000)(“Rather than mandating exact
uniformity between the charges set forth in the extradition request and the actual indictment,
what the doctrine of speciality requires is that the prosecution be based on the same facts
those posed when the United States is asked to extradite a fugitive found here. The
only treaty issue likely to arise after extradition is whether the fugitive was
surrendered subject to any limitations such as those posed by the doctrine of
specialty.
Specialty.
Under the doctrine of specialty, sometimes called speciality, “a person who has
been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an
extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty,
and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition,
until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him after his release or trial
upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly
taken under those proceedings.”89 The limitation, expressly included in many
treaties,90 however, is designed to preclude prosecution for different substantive
offenses and does not bar prosecution for different or additional counts of the same
offense.91 And some courts have held that an offense whose prosecution would be
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as those set forth in the request for extradition”); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895-
96 (D.C.Cir. 1989); United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998)(“the
appropriate test for a violation of specialty is whether the extraditing country would consider
the acts for which the defendant was prosecuted as independent form those for which he was
extradited”); United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir. 1994).
92 United States v. Lazsarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1998)(also noting that
the doctrine of specialty “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes” and
there was no evidence of a demand that the doctrine be applied).
93 United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 784 (1st Cir. 1995).
94 United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995)(“The question of whether
a criminal defendant has standing to assert a violation of the doctrine of specialty has split
the federal circuit courts of appeals”), noting decisions in favor of defendant standing,
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thirion, 813
F.2d 146, 151 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.
1986); and those holding to the contrary, United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th
Cir. 1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also, United
States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 719-20 (9th Cir. 2001)(defendant has standing to object
to substantive but not procedural noncompliance with applicable treaty requirements);
United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1997); The Extra in
Extradition: The Impact of State v. Pang on Extraditee Standing and Implicit Waiver, 24
JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 111 (1998); Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of
Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign,
62 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1187 (1995); BASSIOUNI at 546-60.
95 United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d
1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995); ; United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-1 (3d Cir.
1991); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).
96 18 U.S.C. 3195 (“All costs or expenses incurred in any extradition proceeding in
apprehending, securing, and transmitting a fugitive shall be paid by the demanding authority.
barred by the doctrine may nevertheless be considered for purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines,92 or for purposes of criminal forfeiture.93
The doctrine may be of limited advantage to a given defendant because the
circuits are divided over whether a defendant has standing to claim its benefits.94
Regardless of their view of fugitive standing, they agree that the surrendering state




Our extradition treaties, particularly the more recent ones, often have other less
obvious, infrequently mentioned features. Perhaps the most common of these deal
with the expenses associated with the procedure and representation of the country
requesting extradition before the courts of the country of refuge. The distribution of
costs is ordinarily governed by a treaty stipulation, reflected in federal statutory
provisions,96 under which the country seeking extradition accepts responsibility for
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All witness fees and costs of every nature in cases of international extradition, including the
fees of the magistrate, shall be certified by the judge or magistrate before whom the hearing
shall take place to the Secretary of State of the United States, and the same shall be paid out
of appropriations to defray the expenses of the judiciary or the Department of Justice as the
case may be. The Attorney General shall certify to the Secretary of State the amounts to be
paid to the United States on account of said fees and costs in extradition cases by the foreign
government requesting the extradition, and the Secretary of State shall cause said amounts
to be collected and transmitted to the Attorney General for deposit in the Treasury of the
United States”).
97 Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5 (eff. Dec. 9,
1996)(“2. The Requesting State shall bear the expenses related to the translation of
documents and transportation of the person surrendered. The Requested State shall pay all
other expenses incurred in that State by reason of the extradition proceedings. 3. Neither
State shall make any pecuniary claim against the other State arising out of the arrest,
detention, examination, or surrender of persons sought under this Treaty”); Indian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-30 (eff. July 21, 1999); French
Extradition Treaty, Art. 22, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc. 105-13 (eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Jordanian
Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Extradition Treaty
with Thailand, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991); Jamaican Extradition
Treaty, Art. XVII, ¶¶1, 3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)(also requesting state
may be subject to a claim due to special expenses or concerning third party interests in
transferred property); Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 18, ¶¶2 & 3, S. Treaty
Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XXI, 35 U.S.T. 3041
(1984); but see, Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶¶3 & 4, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff.
Nov. 21, 1966)(“The Requesting State shall bear expenses related to the translation of
documents and the transportation of the person sought. 4. Neither Party shall make any
pecuniary claim against the other arising from the arrest, detention, custody, examination,
or surrender of a person sought under this Treaty”)(note absence of language as to the
responsibility for cost other than transportation or translation); Extradition Treaty with
Uruguay, Art. 18, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (similar).
98 Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995)(“The
Requested State shall advise, assist, appear in court on behalf of the Requesting State, and
represent the interests of the Requesting State, in any proceedings arising out of a request
for extradition”); Extradition Treaty with Luxembourg, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 1-5-10
(eff. Feb. 1, 2002); Extradition Treaty with Sri Lanka, Art. 19, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.106-34
(eff. Jan. 12, 2001); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5;
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 18, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22,
1994); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991);
Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶¶1 & 2, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966);
Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 18, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (1983); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art XX, 35 U.S.T. 3040 (1984) Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XVII, ¶2, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991)(“The Requested State shall also provide for the
representation of the Requesting State in any proceedings arising in the Requested State out
of a request for extradition”); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 18, ¶2, S. Treaty Doc.
98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991).
any translation expenses and the costs of transportation after surrender, and the
country of refuge assumes responsibility for all other costs.97 Although sometimes
included in a separate article, contemporary treaties generally make the country of
refuge responsible for legal representation of the country seeking extradition.98
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99 The typical clause provides that “All articles, instruments, objects of value, documents,
and other evidence relating to the offense may be seized and, upon granting of extradition,
surrendered to the requesting State. The property mentioned in this Article may be
surrendered even when extradition cannot be granted or effected due to the death,
disappearance, or escape of the person sought. The rights of third parties in such property
shall be duly respected,” Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17
(eff. Oct. 11, 1991); see also, South African Extradition Treaty, Art.16, S. Treaty Doc. 106-
24 (eff. June 25, 2001); Extradition Treaty with Trinidad and Tobago, Art. 13, ¶1, S. Treaty
Doc. 105-21 (eff. Nov. 29, 1999); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 15, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc.
104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5;
Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 16, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22,
1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XIV, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966);
Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 16, 35 U.S.T. 3215 (1983); Italian Extradition
Treaty, Art XVIII, 35 U.S.T. 3039 (1984) Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XVI, ¶1, S.
Treaty Doc. 98-18 (eff. July 7, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 16, S. Treaty
Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17, 1991).
100 E.g., Extradition Treaty with the Bahamas, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept.
22, 1994)(“(1) Either Contracting State may authorize transportation through its territory of
a person surrendered to the other State by a third State. A request for transit shall be made
through the diplomatic channel and shall contain a description of the person being
transported and a brief statement of the facts of the case. (2) No authorization is required
where air transportation is used and no landing is scheduled on the territory of the
Contracting State. If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the other Contracting
State, transit shall be subject to paragraph (1) of this Article. That Contracting State shall
detain the person to be transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is
effected, so long as the request is received within 96 hours of the unscheduled landing”); see
also, Argentine Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 105-18 (eff. June 15, 2000);
Korean Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 106-2 (eff. Dec. 20, 1999); Costa Rican
Extradition Treaty, Art. 19, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct. 11, 1991); Jordanian Extradition
Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995); Hungarian Extradition Treaty,
Art. 19, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5; Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. XV, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22
(eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff.
May 17, 1991); Extradition Treaty with Uruguay, Art. 17, 35 U.S.T. 3216 (1983); Italian
Extradition Treaty, Art XIX, 35 U.S.T. 3040 (1984).
Transfer of Evidence.
Contemporary treaties regularly permit a country to surrender documents and
other evidence along with an extradited fugitive. An interesting attribute of these
clauses is that they permit transfer of the evidence even if the fugitive becomes
unavailable for extradition. This may make some sense in the case of disappearance
or flight, but seems a bit curious in the case of death.99
Transit.
A somewhat less common clause permits transportation of a fugitive through
the territory of either of the parties to a third country without the necessity of
following the treaty’s formal extradition procedure.100
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101 “The Treaty was a response by the United States and British executive branches to
several recent federal court decisions denying requests by the United Kingdom for the
extradition of members of the Provisional Irish Republic Army . . . . [T]he denied requests
were for PIRA members who had committed violent acts against British forces occupying
Northern Ireland . . . Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 559 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Mullen, No.
3-78-1099 MG (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979),” Questions of Justice; U.S. Courts’ Powers of
Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 474, 475-76 n.8 (1987); see also, Comparative
Application of the Non-Discrimination Clause in the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 5 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 493 (1993).
102 “For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be regarded as
an offense of a political character: (a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have
the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person
sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; (b)
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; (c) kidnaping,
abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; (d) an offense
involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any
incendiary device if this use endangers any person; (e) an attempt to commit any of the
foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts
to commit such an offense,” British Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Art. 1, S. Exec. Rep.
99-17 (eff. Dec. 23, 1986).
103 “(a) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Supplementary Treaty, extradition shall
not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial
authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions,” id. at Art. 3(a).
104 “(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the
defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for defenses listed in Article 1 of this
Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by
either party to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate. The
appeal shall receive expedited consideration at every stage. The time for filing notice of
appeal shall be 30 days from the date of the filing of the decision. In all other respects, the
applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as
appropriate, shall govern the appeals process,” id. at Art. 3(b).
U.K. Supplementary Treaty
Unique irritants in diplomatic relations between the United States and Great
Britain stimulated a supplementary extradition treaty with singular characteristics.101
“The Supplementary Treaty alters the extradition procedures in force under the 1977
Treaty in three significant ways: (1) it limits the scope of the political offense
exception;102 (2) it authorizes a degree of judicial inquiry into the factors motivating
a request for extradition;103 and (3) it creates a limited right to appeal an extradition
decision,”104 In re Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d at 465 (9th Cir. 1998), redesignated,
In re Artt, 248 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2001).
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105 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d
487, 493-95 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212-213 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Matt-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995) .
106 E.g., Extradition Treaty with Thailand, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 98-16 (eff. May 17,
1991) (“If the person sought irrevocably agrees in writing to extradition after personally
being advised by the competent authority of his right to formal extradition proceedings and
the protection afforded by them, the Requested State may grant extradition without formal
extradition proceedings”); see also, Extradition Treaty with Cyprus, Art.17, S. Treaty Doc.
105-16 (eff. Sept. 14, 1999); Austrian Extradition Treaty, Art. 20, S. Treaty Doc. 105-50
(eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Costa Rican Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 98-17 (eff. Oct.
11, 1991); Jordanian Extradition Treaty, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. 104-3 (eff. July 29, 1995);
Hungarian Extradition Treaty, Art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. 104-5; Extradition Treaty with the
Bahamas, Art. 15, S. Treaty Doc. 102-17 (eff. Sept. 22, 1994); Bolivian Extradition Treaty,
Art. XIII, S. Treaty Doc. 104-22 (eff. Nov. 21, 1966); Italian Extradition Treaty, Art XVII,
35 U.S.T. 3039 (1984); Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. XV, ¶1, S. Treaty Doc. 98-18
(eff. July 7, 1991); see generally, ABBELL & RISTAU at 143-46, 306-7.
107 United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rezaq, 134
F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C.Cir. 1998); BASSIOUNI, at 183-248; ABBELL&RISTAU §13-5-2(2) (“In
recent years, it has not been uncommon for foreign officials, particularly in lesser developed
countries, to put a person sought by the United States on an airplane bound for this country
in the custody of either United States law enforcement agents or their own law enforcement
agents. Such deportation takes place without the requested country resorting to its formal
administrative or judicial deportation procedures. It occurs most frequently in narcotics
cases, and generally takes place where there is a close working relationship between United
States law enforcement officers posted in that country and the police authorities of that
country . . . . In addition to informal deportation by airplane, there is a large volume of
informal deportations from Mexico to the United States. Most of these informal
deportations are based on informal arrangements among local United States and Mexican
law enforcement officials along the United States-Mexico border . . .”).
Alternatives to Extradition
The existence of an extradition treaty does not preclude the United States
acquiring personal jurisdiction over a fugitive by other means, unless the treaty
expressly provides otherwise.105
Waiver.
Waiver or “simplified” treaty provisions allow a fugitive to consent to
extradition without the benefit of an extradition hearing.106 Although not universal,
the provisions constitute the least controversial of the alternatives to extradition.
Immigration Procedures.
Whether by a process similar to deportation or by simple expulsion, the United
States has had some success encouraging other countries to surrender fugitives other
than their own nationals without requiring recourse to extradition.107 Ordinarily,
American immigration procedures, on the other hand, have been less accommodating
CRS-29
108 E.g., I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992); Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The
Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 317 (1992).
109 E.g., Kalejs v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993)(deportation to Australia of a member
of a German mobile killing unit in World War II who falsified immigration forms but who
came to this country by way of Australia).
110 The United States has denaturalized and deported former Nazi death camp guards who
gained entry into the United States and/or American citizenship by concealing their pasts,
e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); United States v. Stelmokas, 110 F.3d 302
(3d Cir. 1997); see also, The Denaturalization and Extradition of Ivan the Terrible, 26
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 821 (1995); Bassiouni, at 183-232 (summarizing alternatives and
criticizing their use in some instances).
111 United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130-132 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir.
1997).
112 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v. Torres
Gonzalez, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001); Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 493-500 (4th Cir.
2002); but see, United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 (9th Cir.
1995)(suggesting the possibility of a different result, “the only way we could exercise our
supervisory powers in this particular case is if the defendant could demonstrate government
misconduct ‘of the most shocking and outrageous kind,’ so as to warrant dismissal”).
113 Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983); Extradition of Government Agents as a
Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored Kidnaping, 81 CALIFORNIALAWREVIEW 1541
(1993); Transborder Abductions by American Bounty Hunters—The Jaffe Case and a New
Understanding Between the United States and Canada, 20 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 489 (1990).
114 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1052-60 (9th Cir. 2001).
and have been called into play only when extradition has been found wanting.108
They tend to be time consuming and usually can only be used in lieu of extradition
when the fugitive is an alien. Moreover, they frequently require the United States to
deposit the alien in a country other than one that seeks his or her extradition.109 Yet
in a few instances where an alien has been become naturalized by deception or where
the procedures available against alien terrorists come into play, denaturalization or
deportation may be considered an attractive alternative or supplement to extradition
proceedings.110
Irregular Rendition/Abduction.
Although far less numerous, American use of “irregular rendition” is a far more
widely recognized alternative to extradition. An alternative of last resort, it involves
kidnaping or deceit and has been reserved for terrorists, drug traffickers, and the
like.111 Kidnaping a defendant overseas and returning him to the United States for
trial does not deprive American courts of jurisdiction unless an applicable extradition
treaty explicitly calls for that result.112 The individuals involved in the abduction,
however, may face foreign prosecution, or at least be the subject of a foreign
extradition request.113 And the United States may be liable for claim under the
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Appendix
Countries with Whom the United States Has an Extradition
Treaty
Country Citation
Albania 49 Stat. 3313.
Antigua and Barbuda T.Doc. 104-19 (entered into force 7/1/99)
Argentina T.Doc. 105-18 (entered into force 6/6/01)
Australia 27 UST 957.
TIAS (entered into force 12/21/92)
Austria T.Doc. 105-50 (entered into force 1/1/00)
Bahamas TIAS (entered into force 9/22/94)
Barbados T.Doc. 105-20 (entered into force 3/3/00)
Belgium T.Doc. 104-8 (entered into force 9/1/97)
Belize T.Doc. 106-38 (entered into force 3/27/01)
Bolivia TIAS (entered into force 11/21/96)
Brazil 15 UST 2093.
15 UST 2112.
Bulgaria 43 Stat. 1886.
49 Stat. 3250.
Burma 47 Stat. 2122.
Canada 27 UST 983.
27 UST 1017.
TIAS (entered into force 11/26/91)
Chile 32 Stat. 1850.
Colombia TIAS (entered into force 3/4/82)




Costa Rica TIAS (entered into force 10/11/91)
Cuba 33 Stat. 2265.
33 Stat. 2273.
44 Stat. 2392.
Cyprus T.Doc. 105-16 (entered into force 9/14/99)
Czech Republic 44 Stat. 2367.
49 Stat. 3253.
Denmark 25 UST 1293.
Dominica T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 5/25/00)
Dominican Republic 36 Stat. 2468.
Ecuador 18 Stat. 199.
55 Stat. 1196.
Egypt 19 Stat. 572.
El Salvador 37 Stat. 1516.
Estonia 43 Stat. 1849.
49 Stat. 3190.
CRS-35
Fiji 47 Stat. 2122.
24 UST 1965.
Finland 31 UST 944.
France T.Doc. 105-13 (entered into force 2/1/02).
Gambia 47 Stat. 2122.
Germany, 32 UST 1485.
Federal Republic of TIAS (entered into force: 3/11/93)
Ghana 47 Stat. 2122.
Greece 47 Stat. 2185.
51 Stat. 357.
Grenada T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 9/14/99)
Guatemala 33 Stat. 2147.
55 Stat. 1097.
Guyana 47 Stat. 2122.
Haiti 34 Stat. 2858.
Honduras 37 Stat. 1616.
45 Stat. 2489.
Hong Kong T.Doc. 105-3 (entered into force 1/21/98)
Hungary T.Doc. 104-5 (entered into force 3/8/97)
Iceland 32 Stat. 1096.
34 Stat. 2887.
India T.Doc. 105-30 (entered into force 7/21/99)
Iraq 49 Stat. 3380.
Ireland TIAS 10813
Israel 14 UST 1707.
18 UST 382.
Italy TIAS 10837.
Jamaica 47 Stat. 2122.
TIAS (entered into force 7/7/91)
Japan 31 UST 892.
Jordan T.Doc. 104-3 (entered into force:7/29/95)
Kenya 47 Stat. 2122.
16 UST 1866.
Kiribati 28 UST 227.
Korea T.Doc. 106-2 (entered into force 12/20/99)
Latvia 43 Stat. 1738.
49 Stat. 3131.
Lesotho 47 Stat. 2122.
Liberia 54 Stat. 1733.
Liechtenstein 50 Stat. 1337.
Lithuania 43 Stat. 1835.
49 Stat. 3077.
Luxembourg T.Doc. 105-10 (entered into force 2/1/02)
Malawi 47 Stat. 2122.
18 UST 1822.
Malaysia T.Doc. 104-26 (entered into force 6/2/97).
Malta 47 Stat. 2122.
Mauritius 47 Stat. 2122.
CRS-36
115 Treaty entered into force for: Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and Netherlands Antilles.
Mexico 31 UST 5059
T.Doc. 105-46 (entered into force 5/21/01)
Monaco 54 Stat. 1780.
Nauru 47 Stat. 2122.
Netherlands115 TIAS 10733.
New Zealand 22 UST 1.
Nicaragua 35 Stat. 1869.
Nigeria 47 Stat. 2122.
Norway 31 UST 5619.
Pakistan 47 Stat. 2122.
Panama 34 Stat. 2851.
Papua New Guinea 47 Stat. 2122.
Paraguay T.Doc. 106-4 (entered into force 3/9/01)
Peru 31 Stat. 1921.
Philippines 1994 UNTS 279 (entered into force 11/22/96)
Poland T.Doc. 105-14 (entered into force 9/17/99)
Portugal 35 Stat. 2071.
Romania 44 Stat. 2020.
50 Stat. 1349.
Saint Christopher
and Nevis T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 2/23/00)
Saint Lucia T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 2/2/00)
Saint Vincent &
the Grenadines T.Doc. 105-19 (entered into force 9/8/99)
San Marino 35 Stat. 1971.
49 Stat. 3198.
Seychelles 47 Stat. 2122.
Sierra Leone 47 Stat. 2122.
Singapore 47 Stat. 2122.
20 UST 2764.
Slovak Republic 44 Stat. 2367.
49 Stat. 3253.
Solomon Islands 28 UST 277.
South Africa T.Doc. 106-24 (entered into force 6/25/01)
Spain 22 UST 737.
29 UST 2283
TIAS (entered into force 7/2/93)
TIAS (entered into force 7/25/99)
Sri Lanka T.Doc. 106-34 (entered into force 1/12/01)
Suriname 26 Stat. 1481.
33 Stat. 2257.
Swaziland 47 Stat. 2122.
21 UST 1930.
Sweden 14 UST 1845.
TIAS 10812.
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Switzerland T.Doc. 104-9 (entered into force 9/10/97).
Tanzania 47 Stat. 2122.
16 UST 2066.
Thailand 43 Stat. 1749.
TIAS (entered into force 5/17/91)
Tonga 47 Stat. 2122.
28 UST 5290.
Trinidad and Tobago T.Doc. 105-21 (entered into force 11/29/99)
Turkey 32 UST 3111.
Tuvalu 28 UST 227.
32 UST 1310.
United Kingdom 28 UST 227.
TIAS 12050
Uruguay TIAS 10850.
Venezuela 43 Stat. 1698.
Zambia 47 Stat. 2122.
Zimbabwe T.Doc. 105-33(entered into force 4/26/00)
CRS-38























































































* The United States had an extradition treaty with the former Yugoslavia prior to its breakup (32
Stat. 1890).
* Although not specifically identified in the State Department's TREATIES IN FORCE (1998), the
United States apparently has extradition agreements with the Republics of Palau, the Marshall Islands,
and Micronesia, cf., In re Extradition of Lin, 915 F.Supp. 206, 207 (D.Guam 1995); P.L. 99-239, 99 Stat.
1770 (1986); H.Rept. 99-188 (Pt.1) 192 (1985).
